This article provides a description and critical edition of al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ's Mukhtaṣar fī ithbāt al-aʿrād. The work appears to be extracted from a larger treatise. It is concerned with the proof of the reality of "accidents", a central concept in the ontology of kalām.
fers in the kalām context to one of the two subclasses of entities or things (ashyāʾ or dhawāt) that make up the created world. The other subclass of entities are atoms (jawāhir) , that is, indivisible particles from which bodies can be composed. Accidents were believed to determine the changeable qualities of atoms and bodies, including colour, taste, their position in space or their movement. Kalām theologians had a specific interest in these accidents, because an important proof for the existence of God relied on the assumption that their notion of accidents was actually true. More precisely, accidents were used in their demonstration of the temporal existence of composed bodies, something that presupposes a Creator who cannot be other than God.4 The reasoning for establishing the temporal existence of bodies, and consequently the need for a Creator, was traditionally structured into four "premises" (daʿāwī). The argument started by positing that bodies are positioned in space such that they are either composed or separated from each other, either moving or resting. Yet bodies cannot be composed, separated, moving or resting by virtue of themselves: otherwise a composed body could never be separated, nor would a moving body ever rest, and vice versa. Therefore, composition, separation, movement and rest must be determined by something distinct from the bodies themselves (premise 1).
The proof then goes on to argue that that which determines composition and separation, movement and rest must be created entities inherent to bodies. For if they were not created, they would necessarily be eternal. Yet we know that composed bodies can be separated and that moving bodies can come to rest. This is only possible, however, on condition that that which determines the body's composition or movement may cease to exist, and so we must exclude their eternity and affirm their createdness (premise 2).
The proof then refers back to the argument advanced in premise 1-namely that bodies are always positioned in space-in order to establish that spatial qualities are actually a necessary condition for a body to exist. This claim is based on the observation that there is no body in this world that is not located somewhere in space and neither moving nor resting. Carrying accidents is consequently necessary for bodies, such that we cannot possisurvived under the titles Masʾala fī kayfiyyat wujūd al-aʿrāḍ and Kayfiyyat wujūd al-aʿrāḍ al-mūṣila fī bayān dhālika ilā ablagh al-aʿrāḍ. Another work on accidents by him, entitled Kitāb Kashf al-aʿrāḍ ʿan al-aḥwāl, appears to be lost. For further details and references see Thiele, Theologie in der jemenitischen Zaydiyya, For this proof see Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, bly conceive of bodies that are free from accidents or even precede them in existence (premise 3).
The proof closes with the conclusion that if bodies necessarily carry accidents that have temporal existence, they must have temporal existence, too (premise 4).5
The short text by al-Raṣṣāṣ presented here obviously has to be contextualised within this proof. Whilst it circulated-and actually only survivedindependently under the title Mukhtaṣar fī ithbāt al-aʿrāḍ, this does not appear to have been its original form. Rather, the text seems to be a subsection of a more comprehensive work, in all likelihood a theological summa. This is evident from two cross-references to other sections that are not included in this manuscript copy. One of them refers to the demonstration that man is not capable of creating bodies. The second cross-reference offers clearer indications about the nature of the text from which the Mukhtaṣar was extracted. The text cites a "first premise" (al-daʿwā l-ūlā) that contained a proof for the claim that the movement and rest of bodies must be caused by entities that subsist in them. This corresponds precisely to the first of the four premises of the classical proof for the temporal existence of bodies as summarised above. This proof is traditionally found in theological summae. It is consequently possible that the Mukhtaṣar belongs to al-Raṣṣāṣ's most extensive theological compendium, entitled Kitāb al-Tibyān, the beginning of which is missing. Alternatively, one could also plausibly speculate that the Mukhtaṣar was extracted from some other, today completely unknown, work.
The title Mukhtaṣar fī ithbāt al-aʿrāḍ means "Brief treatise on establishing [the reality] of accidents" and aptly describes the purpose of this short work: it attempts to prove that accidents are actual components of the crea-5 The proof summarised above is included in al-Raṣṣāṣ's al-Tibyān, fols 1a-7a-the beginning is missing, though, and the text starts in the middle of daʿwā 2. At some point in the history of Islamic theology, this proof came under criticism. Theologians like Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 426/1044) identified such deficiencies as the lack of a rational proof against the possibility of an infinite series of created accidents, an assumption that would completely undermine the conclusion that bodies must have temporal existence. Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī and ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī (d. 415/1025) had already advanced arguments against an infinite series of created accidents (these arguments are related by Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muʿtamad, p. 85 and have been discussed by Madelung, "Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's Proof for the Existence of God," p. 277). In his Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl (fol. 215a-b), al-Raṣṣāṣ also reacts to the criticism against the proof in its traditional form and introduces a daʿwā to rebut the possibility of an infinite series of accidents, that would undermine the argument. His line of reasoning is that the very concept of createdness excludes the possibility of there being an infinite series of created beings: if an entity E n came into existence only after an infinite series of entities, it would never come into existence.
ted world and distinct from the atoms of which the bodies that surround us are made up. community, possibly by Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Mazdak.14 Aside from these texts with an exclusive focus on "physics", we know of a number of comprehensive theological works with in-depth discussions of accidents: by way of example for works written before al-Raṣṣāṣ, it is worth mentioning the exhaustive sections on accidents found in the tenth part of al-Ḥākim alJishumī's Kitāb al-ʿUyūn15 and the autocommentary Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-masāʾil,16 or the second section of al-Jishumī's three-part al- In comparison to these profound discussions on accidents, al-Raṣṣāṣ's Mukhtaṣar fī ithbāt al-aʿrāḍ is of much more limited scope. Its express purpose is to establish that the assumption of there being accidents is actually true, and to demonstrate this claim for the 22 types of accidents posited by his school of theology. These 22 types include the following: sounds (aṣwāt), pains (ālām), colours (alwān), tastes (ṭuʿūm), smells (rawāʾiḥ), heat (ḥarāra) and cold (burūda), accidents of location (kawn), the accident that causes a composition of two atoms (taʾlīf), the so-called accident of "pressure" (iʿ-timād), by virtue of which an atom sets other atoms in motion, convictions (iʿtiqādāt), will (irādāt), aversion (karāhāt), assumptions (ẓunūn), thoughts (afkār), capability of action (qudra), life (ḥayāt), desire (shahwa), distaste (nifār), moisture (ruṭūba), dryness (yubūsa), and finally the accident of "annihilation" (fanāʾ), by virtue of which atoms cease to exist.18
For his demonstration, al-Raṣṣāṣ distinguishes between perceivable and non-perceivable accidents. The reasoning behind this distinction is that the reality of perceivable accidents does not need a rational proof. Rather, they are immediately knowable (maʿlūma bi-l-iḍṭirār).19 Therefore, al-Raṣṣāṣ limits himself in their case to excluding that they are not bodies and do not occupy space.
As for the first two accidents included within the perceivable accidents, al-Raṣṣāṣ's argument against their being a body is quite simple. Man is able to produce sounds and pains, but he is not able to produce bodies. Hence sounds and pains cannot be bodies.
The remaining perceivable accidents are colours, smells, tastes, heat and cold. If they were bodies, al-Raṣṣāṣ argues, they would resemble each other in that they would be made up of atoms, and they would additionally share a quality specific to existent bodies: they would occupy space. Yet accidents that belong to the five abovementioned types do not resemble each other: black and white, acid and sweet, etc. are distinct. So if a black, a white, an acid and a sweet atom are similar with respect to their occupying space, such supplemental qualities as blackness, whiteness, acidness and sweetness must be grounded in something distinct from atoms themselves.
After having precluded the idea that these accidents are bodies, alRaṣṣāṣ advances two arguments against the possibility of their occupying space. The first relies again on the principle that occupying space is a quality specific to atoms and bodies. Consequently, if accidents occupied space, one would have to concede that they are all similar and also similar to bodies, a claim that is inconsistent with the distinctiveness of accidents. The second argument is based on the doctrine that one locus of being can only be occupied by one entity. However, one atom can carry multiple accidents, including colour, smell, taste, heat and cold, something that would be impossible if these accidents occupied space.
Al-Raṣṣāṣ then turns to the proof of the reality of the fifteen types of non-perceivable accidents. He begins with accidents of location, that cause the combination, separation, motion and rest of bodies. These four modalities of being located in space, al-Raṣṣāṣ argues, are contingent qualities and subject to change. There must consequently be something that determines the separation of a formerly combined body or its coming to rest after having been moving. In this context, al-Raṣṣāṣ refers to the "first premise" [of the proof of creation], in which this idea is further developed.
With regard to "composition" and "pressure", al-Raṣṣāṣ advances the same argument from contingency as he did previously with regard to accidents of location. In addition, he also clarifies the conceptual distinction between "composition" (taʾlīf) and "combination" (ijtimāʿ) as well as between "pressure" (iʿtimād) and "motion" (ḥaraka).
The next paragraph is concerned with demonstrating that beliefs, wills, aversions, assumptions and thoughts are accidents. Al-Raṣṣāṣ's starting point is our common experience that we are all believing, willing, having aversions, assuming and thinking. He then argues that we cannot be so by virtue of ourselves, since this would mean that we possess these qualities necessarily. Yet we start and stop believing, willing, having aversions, assuming and thinking at some point, so that these qualities must be grounded in something distinct from ourselves. This must either be our Creator or some other cause that subsists in us (ʿilla). If our believing, willing, having aversions, assuming and thinking were caused by our Creator, we would have to conclude that these qualities are related to our coming into existence, and so we would believe, will, have aversions, assume and think over the course of our entire existence. Given that this is not the case, our believing, willing, having aversions, assuming and thinking must be caused by entities that come and cease to be and thereby cause changes in us.
The same line of reasoning is then applied by al-Raṣṣāṣ to capability of action, life, desire and aversion: they are not necessary qualities of beings in this world, nor are they unalterably linked to our coming into existence. They must consequently be grounded in distinct entities that may or may not inhere in us.
As for the reality of accidents of moisture and dryness, al-Raṣṣāṣ proposes two proofs. The first argues on the basis of the contingency of moisture and dryness in bodies: if a moist body could also be dry and vice versa, something must be the cause for a body to be either moist or dry. The second proof is based on the theory that composites become stable whenever they consist of both moist and dry atoms, so that the mere existence of such material is sufficient evidence for the presence of accidents of moisture and dryness in its components.
The reality of the last type of accidents, that of "annihilation", is, according to al-Raṣṣāṣ, a logical corollary of the belief that one day the world will no longer exist. This belief entails that each individual body and atom must cease to exist at some point. Yet if bodies and atoms have continuous existence, there must be something by virtue of which they come to be annihilated. According to al-Raṣṣāṣ, this something must be the existence of an entity that has to be conceived of as the opposite of bodies and atoms. He concludes that this must be an accident, which has neither a substrate nor continuous existence.20
Al-Raṣṣāṣ's Mukhtaṣar fits entirely into the Bahshamī theories about accidents. The topic had already been comprehensively covered in fundamental works by previous theologians, including For kalām schools other than Baṣran Muʿtazilism, there was no reason to claim an accident of "annihilation", wherefore the notion of fanāʾ faced much criticism. Abū lQāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Balkhī (d. 319/931), the head of the Muʿtazila of Baghdad, and Ashʿarite theologians negated that atoms continue to exist by virtue of themselves. Rather, they affirmed the principle of creatio continua and believed that atoms continue to exist by virtue of an accident of "continuity" (baqāʾ), which is re-created by God at any instant of time; see Gimaret, pp. 49; Perler and Rudolph, Occasionalismus, kira, with which al-Raṣṣāṣ was familiar.21 His discussion is relatively detailed, if we assume that the Mukhtaṣar actually is an extract from a theological summa, as I argued above. This could be explained either by the comprehensiveness of the-currently unidentifiable-text from which the Mukhtaṣar was taken or by al-Raṣṣāṣ's deliberately putting emphasis on proving the actual reality of accidents. The latter explanation would make some sense, considering that the notion of accidents was even questioned from within the Muʿtazilite tradition. Zaydiyya, pp. 17, 32, 67n31. 22 There was a debate between the two currents of Muʿtazilism whether or not things are only knowable on condition that they actually exist. Against Ibn al-Malāḥimī, al-Raṣṣāṣ posits that describing something as existent is not identical with describing it's very nature, wherefore even the non-existent can be object of predication and of knowledge. See Ansari, "Al-Barāhīn al-ẓāhira," Ansari, Hassan, "Maḥmūd al-Malāḥimī l-Muʿtazilī fī lYaman," Thiele, Theologie in der jemenitischen Zaydiyya, pp. 63-64. 23 The manuscript is described in Löfgren and Traini, Catalogue, vol. 3, p. 130, no. 1290. copies contained in this collective manuscript is dated.24 However, the blessing tawallā llāh tawfīqahu after al-Raṣṣāṣ's name might indicate that the manuscript was produced when the author was still alive, that is before 584/1188.
